Progress in tobacco control policy making has occurred worldwide through advocacy campaigns involving multiple players-civil society groups, activists, academics, media and policymakers. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)-the first ever global health treatyoutlines evidence-based tobacco control policies. Lebanon ratified the FCTC in 2005, but until 2011, tobacco control policies remained rudimentary and not evidence-based. Beginning in 2009, a concerted advocacy campaign was undertaken by a variety of stakeholders with the aim of accelerating the process of adopting a strong tobacco control policy. The campaign was successful, and Law 174 passed the Lebanese Parliament in August 2011. In this article, we analyse the policy making process that led to the adoption of Law 174 using Kingdon's model. The analysis relies on primary and secondary data sources including historical records of key governmental decisions, documentation of the activities of the concerted advocacy campaign and in-depth interviews with key stakeholders. We describe the opening of a window of opportunity as a result of the alignment of the problem, policy and politics streams. Furthermore, findings revealed that despite the challenge of persistent tobacco industry interference and established power relations between the industry, its allies and policymakers; policy entrepreneurs succeeded in supporting the alignment of the streams, and influencing the passage of the law. Kingdon's multiple stream approach was useful in explaining how tobacco control became an emerging policy issue at the front of the policy agenda in Lebanon.
Introduction
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is an evidence-based treaty that includes a package of policies that ratifying countries must adopt to protect their citizens from the harms of tobacco use. The FCTC is the first global health treaty negotiated by the World Health Organization, and developed in response to the worldwide tobacco epidemic. The treaty includes both demand and supply reduction provisions (WHO 2003) . To date, 181 countries have ratified the FCTC representing over 89% of the world population. Progress in tobacco control policy has been achieved worldwide through concerted advocacy campaigns pushing for evidence informed policies and involving multiple players including civil society groups, activists, academics, media and supportive policymakers (WHO 2003) . Although the literature is abundant with accounts of tobacco-control policy-making in high-income countries (Beaglehole 1991; Chapman and Wakefield 2001; Asbridge 2004; Grü ning et al. 2006; Bickford and Kothari 2008, Breton et al. 2008; Muggli et al. 2008 Muggli et al. , 2010 Hastie and Kothari 2009; Crosbie et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2010; Currie and Clancy 2011; Charoenca et al. 2012; Shirane et al. 2012; Bilira et al. 2012) , few studies report on experiences in low-to middle-income countries (LMICs) (Krasovsky 2010; Bhojani et al. 2013; Higashi et al. 2013) . LMICs, including countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region, face different challenges in evidence-based health policymaking including limited access to research evidence, weak health systems, the influence of commercial interests, among others (Haines et al. 2004; Walt et al. 2008; El-Jardali et al. 2012) .
Several policy models have been proposed to describe the movement of a particular idea to policy (Neilson 2001) . Models have described the whole policy process, or a component of the process, such as agenda setting (Neilson 2001) . One widely used political model which focuses on the movement of an idea to agenda setting is Kingdon's multiple streams approach (Kingdon 1995 ) that explains policy change by looking at the political system as a whole, taking into consideration the continuous and dynamic interplay between individuals, institutions, ideas, agendas and external processes. A review of the health policy process in LMICs confirmed the importance of assessing politics, process and power in any analysis of policy making (Gilson and Raphaely 2008 ). Kingdon's model also suggests that the process of policymaking is random and not predictable (Shiffman and Ved 2007) . Kingdon describes three independent streams-problem, policy and politics-that, when aligned, provide a window of opportunity for change. Kingdon further stresses the importance of policy entrepreneurs in the alignment of the streams. The opportunity for policy change is contingent on the following: (1) consensus that something should be done about a certain issue (problem stream); (2) available effective policy solutions to address the problem (policy stream); and (3) a political context that is supportive (politics stream). This latter stream is dependent on changes in government constituencies resulting from elections or new appointments, or current politicians sensing that 'the time is right' based on various messages they detect from constituents or organized interests. If a problem has been agreed upon, and a solution is available and acceptable, then changes in the political context (politics stream) result in what Kingdon refers to as a 'policy window'. Policy entrepreneurs are central to all the processes described above.
Policy entrepreneurs are advocates for certain ideas or proposals; they may be a part of the government or they may be outside of the government (Kingdon and Thurber 1984) . They are characterized as being persistent but also knowledgeable about the policy solutions, and credible in the community in which they work. Policy entrepreneurs invest time and effort in communicating the necessary information to policy makers. Their efforts contribute to the definition of the problem and the 'softening up' (making it more acceptable) of the policy solution.
Kingdon's multiple streams model has been used to analyse public policy making around a myriad of health issues globally (Sardell and Johnson 1998; Blankenau 2001; Kruger 2001; Laraway and Jennings 2002; Shiffman et al. 2004; Ashford et al. 2006; Odom-Forren and Hahn 2006; O'Sullivan and Lussier-Duynstee 2006; Mannheimer et al. 2007; Shiffman and Ved 2007; Guldbrandsson and Fossum 2009; Ridde 2009; Henstra 2010; Ha et al. 2015; Colombini et al. 2016; Llamas and Mayhew 2016; Smith et al. 2016 ) including tobacco control (Blackman 2005; Greathouse et al. 2005; Mamudu et al. 2014) . The application of the model to LMICs-where problems, policies and politics may differ from those of higher income countries (Walt et al. 2008 ) -has been critiqued, and adaptations and extensions to the model proposed (Shiffman et al. 2004; Colombini et al. 2016; Llamas and Mayhew, 2016) . However, to date, the model has not been used to understand tobacco control policy making in LMICs.
Lebanon ratified the FCTC in 2005, but up until 2011, tobacco control policies remained rudimentary and not evidence-based (Table 1) . Beginning in 2009 and through 2011, a concerted advocacy campaign was undertaken by a variety of stakeholders with the aim of accelerating the process of adopting a strong tobacco control policy in line with the FCTC. This advocacy campaign was successful, and in August 2011, Law 174 passed the Lebanese Parliament with 126 positive votes and 2 abstentions. The provisions of Law 174 included: (1) a ban on smoking in all indoor public spaces, (2) a ban on advertisements, promotion and sponsorship and (3) larger text warnings with the possibility of pictorial warnings. Using Kingdon's multiple streams model, but expanding it beyond agenda-setting to include policy formulation, this manuscript will analyse the tobacco control policy making process in Lebanon, with a focus on the years between 2009 and 2011.
Materials and methods
The analysis relies on primary and secondary data sources. The latter include historical records of key governmental decisions taken in relation to tobacco control (Nakkash 2007) , and documentation of the activities of the advocacy campaign that took place between 2009 and 2011. Primary data includes interviews with key stakeholders who were involved in the policy making process during 2009-2011. The interviews aimed to solicit their viewpoints and perceptions regarding key aspects of the process-including the role that various stakeholders played. Interview questions were broad and intended to understand key aspects and players in this process. Questions included: What is your viewpoint regarding the tobacco control advocacy taking place in Lebanon? What role did research evidence play in helping advocate generally for a law as well as for specific provisions within the law? Who were the actors and what was the role of these specific actors? What other roles could academicians have played to support passage of this law?
Ethical approval for these interviews was obtained from the Institutional Review Board of the American University of Beirut (AUB). Purposeful sampling was adopted with intent to select a diverse group representing the various stakeholders: members of parliament (MPs), representatives of local civil society groups as well as international organizations, and members of the media. In total, 21 key stakeholders who had been directly involved in the campaign that led to the adoption of law 174 were identified and oral consent
Key Messages
• An advocacy campaign, led by policy entrepreneurs, can be effective in achieving policy change in tobacco control.
• The convergence of the problem, policy and politics streams was critical in creating a window of opportunity for the passage of the Law 174 in Lebanon.
• A key aspect of the campaign was the differing roles played by each of the partners in the advocacy campaign.
• The global and local evidence provided by academic researchers-who were perceived to be highly credible messengerswas central in the success of the campaign.
obtained prior to the interview proceeding. The PI on this research was known to many of the interviewees as an academic but had not been actively involved in-nor perceived as the face of-the advocacy campaign led by the university.
All interviews were conducted in colloquial Arabic by a researcher trained in qualitative methodology. The interviewer had not been involved in the tobacco control policy making process and was unknown to all interviewees. Interviews lasted between 20 and 40 min and took place between May and September 2012. Fifteen (out of the 21 identified) stakeholders consented to participate: 4 were members of the Lebanese Parliament; 4 members of local civil societies; 4 newspaper journalists; and 3 representatives of national and international organizations. All the interviews were transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis-a process where a list of themes or patterns that recur in the transcripts are used to interpret a phenomenon of interest to the research in question (Boyatzis 1998 )-was used by the interviewer to code the transcripts. The data were then analysed by recurring themes and emerging patterns. In what follows, we link quotes to the 'position' (Parliamentarian, Journalist, etc.) of each individual interviewee, but do not include actual names of the interviewees.
Results
Kingdon's problem, policy and politics stream-with emphasis on the influence of policy entrepreneurs-will be used to describe the policy making process that led to the adoption of Law 174. As noted by Walt et al. (2008) , it is often difficult to 'tell the story' of policy making. In an attempt to make the complexity of tobacco control policy making in Lebanon a bit clearer, we artificially describe the three streams separately: we focus the problem stream on awareness and acceptance of tobacco use as an issue that needs a solution; the policy stream on the awareness and acceptance of effective and evidence-based solutions to the 'problem'; and the politics stream on the relationship between stakeholders that first created an adversarial environment for tobacco control and eventually a more friendly one. In addition, we describe the history of tobacco control policy making in Lebanon relatively separately from other political events occurring in the country throughout the years. The reality is that these three streams intersect (Howlett et al. 2015) and are woven together into a complex web; clearly evident below in the overlapping of time frames between the 'streams'; and also that the policy making process for tobacco control was intricately linked with the political events of the country. Table 1 describes the history of tobacco control policies in Lebanon. We include this table under the 'problem stream' rather than the 'policy stream' because this history is a clear indication that tobacco control was not an issue that was deemed to require attention, despite attempts in 2003 to suggest a more comprehensive law for discussion (discussed in the 'policy stream' section). Table 1 shows a law requiring warning labels -HW (adopted 1983, revised in 1995) as the only binding tobacco control regulation. A decree passed in 1993 banned smoking in public places. None of these binding or non-binding regulations were strictly implemented.
The problem stream
The lack of attention to-or policy movement on (except in attempts in 2003)-tobacco control was striking given surveys documenting high smoking rates among various population groups (Table 2 ). Justification by policy makers for this lack of attention centered on the fact that the country was still reeling from the 15-year civil war (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and that more important issues were at stake. Indeed, political events were frequent and significant between 1975 and 2011. A 'chronology of key events in the history of Lebanon' provided by the BBC clearly demonstrates the continuous uncertainty and crises (BBC 2017) . In addition, however, tobacco industry documents clearly indicate the meddling of the industry in (2006) governmental decision-making during and after the civil war in Lebanon (Nakkash 2007 , Nakkash and Lee 2008 , 2009 , which also provides a key explanation for the lack of national policy attention to this problem (we come back to this under the politics stream). In 1998, a Lebanese National Tobacco Control Program (NTCP) was established within the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) as part of the World Health Organization (WHO) country program. The appointed directors of the NTCP were not always experts, nor committed to advancing tobacco control. In addition, other than a few years of Bloomberg Global Initiative (GBI) support, the program has been largely underfunded.
Researchers at the AUB began to consistently highlight the local epidemic of tobacco use starting in 1999. Shortly thereafter, they formed the AUB Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG), a multidisciplinary group of researchers committed to advancing evidence for prevention and control of tobacco use and its consequences. Over the next decade and a half, members of the TCRG produced research that provided the evidence-base for framing tobacco use as a major public health problem, and for the relevance and applicability of local solutions (Chaaya et al. 2004 (Chaaya et al. , 2006 Bachir and Chaaya 2008; Saade et al. 2008; Afifi et al. 2013; Alaouie et al. 2013; Khalil et al. 2013; Salti et al. 2015; Jawad et al. 2017) . One Parliamentarian interviewee summarized the impact of the evidence provided by the TCRG by stating:
They contributed to providing the scientific facts around the quality of air we breathe, about cancer related deaths, economic effects and experiences of other countries in implementing laws (Parliamentarian 1).
Efforts to move tobacco into the policy spotlight stymied between 2005 and 2008 because of the harsh political realities of Lebanon after Prime Minister Hariri's assassination. In November 2009, the NTCP launched a nationwide mass media campaign on the dangers of second hand smoke, and in 2010, the NTCP received a grant from the GBI to support activities leading to a comprehensive tobacco control law. Around that same time-at the national level, interviewees noted that tobacco use was increasingly being referred to as a public health problem by academics, a highly active civil society, and the public; causing a non-smoking culture to begin to infiltrate Lebanon. A representative from an international health organization noted:
The ground was ready and the people were accepting of the idea, so people knew if they want to smoke, it is a sensitive issue, that you should smoke outside, those that have asthma don't smoke, almost all hospitals started to respond. Society was more agreeable than parliamentarians (International Health Organization 1).
Restaurants began to voluntarily implement non-smoking policies (Nakkash et al. 2010) , and smokers became sensitive to this health issue.
They (smokers) ask you before lighting a cigar or cigarette; they ask if you are bothered from their smoking so some sort of awareness was in place that smoking that is harmful. This development is very important (Parliamentarian 2).
By continuously providing local data on the high prevalence of tobacco use, as well as on its serious health and economic consequences, researchers and activists influenced the problem stream. However, violent political events (civil war, assassination of the prime minister, public protests related to Syrian government presence in Lebanon, etc.) stymied progress at various times over the decades from 1975 to 2011, despite attempts to raise the issue of tobacco to the policy agenda. Although there was no specific focusing event, by 2009, there was enough local evidence to counter any voices attempting to minimize the tobacco problem; and a political environment between 2009 and 2011 with less acute violence (BBC 2017).
The policy stream
In 2003, two proposed tobacco control laws surfaced in Lebanon and consecutively circulated among the concerned parliamentary committees for deliberation. The first focused on a total ban of tobacco advertising and sponsorship; and the other was more comprehensive and included articles related to health warning labelling, a ban on smoking in closed public places, an advertising ban and ban of sales to minors. Although important, the proposed laws were only sporadically discussed by relevant parliamentary committees (only one law reached the Council of Ministers for discussion) and then shelved. In 2005, following WHO Lebanon and MOPH NTCP efforts, Lebanon ratified the FCTC. Interviewees stated that the FCTC brought attention to the topic at a national level particularly that it included evidence-based policy solutions to the problem of tobacco use-increasingly being recognized as a public health threat. As noted by a parliamentarian, WHO played an important role in the process of ratification. That period there were political problems and the parliament shut down, so we were not able to move forward with the law, there was no movement of any laws, the Parliament was closed. From 2008 to 2011, we started to move the idea of the tobacco control law, and we were joined in that from civil society organizations, and academics particularly from AUB . . . who followed this proposal and supported the law (Parliamentarian 2).
Although the elements in the proposed draft law in [2008] [2009] were not completely in line with the FCTC, there was at least initial acceptance by policymakers of the need to discuss the proposed draft law. The proposed law contradicted the FCTC in the following ways: (1) allowing for smoking and non-smoking sections in restaurants and other closed public places; (2) proposing gradual implementation of the provisions of the law with delays reaching up to five years; (3) stipulating partial bans of advertising; (4) proposing only textual HW which covered 30% of the overall size of the pack or less; and (5) not including a financial penalty for violations (fines).
In an attempt to influence the policy stream through evidencebased solutions, the TCRG academic researchers partnered with civil society and media to form a coalition with intent to influence the law with the following expected changes: (1) total bans of smoking in indoor public places without exemptions and without permission for smoking and non-smoking areas; (2) total comprehensive advertising bans, both direct and indirect (including promotions, branding, etc.); (3) and large pictorial HW on tobacco products that cover at least 40% of the two larger surfaces of the pack with rotating messages every six months to avoid wear-out.
The credibility and trust in academics was valuable and strengthened the policy stream. As noted by one of the parliamentarians:
It [the information] is coming from academics, but it is complete and objective and based on facts. These academicians have the necessary information, and they have contacts with other countries' experiences and thus would bring all that information into the drafting of the law (Parliamentarian 3).
A journalist also confirmed the value of information presented by academics:
When we say that [Professor from Academia] is saying this [providing information about the negative effects of smoking], this creates a higher credibility for the people. So this has an enormous effect in convincing the general public and in decreasing conflict (Journalist 2).
The different sources of evidence used in the advocacy campaign included studies conducted by the TCRG; as well as synthesized data from reports by the WHO and other leading International organizations focused on tobacco control (e.g. data related to the number of countries globally that ban advertising; worldwide practices in imposing fines for violations of smoke-free laws, evaluations of smoke-free laws and complete advertising bans, effectiveness of large pictorial warnings); statements from the MOPH NTCP or local NGOs such as Tobacco-Free Initiative (TFI).
The three specific policy solutions listed above and advocated by the FCTC were communicated in various ways (see Table 3 ). The evidence-based research was valued by interviewees.
I am a believer that no law can be solid, true and beneficial if it did not rely on science. That is why this law, the tobacco policy, is based on science and thousands of studies that proved, over years and years, throughout the world, the negative health effects of smoking (Parliamentarian 2).
The importance of local research in persuading policy makers was emphasized by interviewees.
There was the WHO that the Ministry of Public Health acquires information from, but for us when we tell parliamentarians that this was done in America they would say this works in America but not in Lebanon. So, the specialized studies that were done by the AUB were about Lebanon and they could not tell us that it was not relevant (Civil Society Organization 1).
Overall, academics were portrayed to play an important role in the policy stream, and were seen as policy entrepreneurs. Many of the interviewees expressed that-for the first time in Lebanon, academics got out of their 'natural role' and became activists and lobbied for a policy. Academics' role to translate knowledge and coordinate the advocacy campaign was supported by funding from several organizations, notably the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC).
The ratification of the FCTC and concomitant requirement to implement its treaties; along with the strong and consistent provision of local and international evidence of solutions presented by a coalition of researchers, civil society leaders, and the media through a concerted advocacy campaign led to a favourable policy stream by 2009.
The politics stream
Within the context of uncertainty and instability which characterizes Lebanon's political situation, tobacco control has been a highly sensitive topic to discuss. The tobacco industry in Lebanon is operated by a government run monopoly, the Regie-which is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and holds exclusive rights to import, export and produce tobacco. Tobacco is a subsidized agricultural product where leaf exports are based on a barter system; tobacco is exchanged for foreign-made cigarettes. The primary objective of this system is the protection of leaf growers in rural areas, particularly in the South of Lebanon, an area previously occupied by Israel. Keeping farmers on the land has been seen by the State as an important geopolitical objective and the subsidy makes up the only income for many of the tobacco farmers.
With this backdrop in mind, policymaking for tobacco control has not been a favourable topic. Prior to 2009, the tobacco industry had free reign over Lebanon for decades. Tobacco industry documents make clear that the tobacco industry contributed to weakening tobacco control in Lebanon from the 1970s to early 2000s through monitoring and, when necessary, undermining proposed legislation (Nakkash and Lee 2009 ). This influence of the tobacco industry and its allies, particularly the local monopoly, the Regie, continued through 2009 even after a draft tobacco control law was presented (Nakkash and Lee 2008) .
In fact, during many of the parliamentary deliberations, the only non-parliamentary presence was representatives of the tobacco industry, and/or their allies such as the Regie or hospitality sector. The twist in 2009, however, was the presence of a concurrent advocacy campaign providing data to various stakeholders in and out of government in support of an evidence-based comprehensive tobacco control law in line with FCTC requirements. Academic researchers, sensing the heightened attention and national mood around tobacco control, went beyond their conventional role as knowledge producers, and took on the role of facilitators to the national advocacy campaign. This was achieved through partnership building. The TCRG partnered with like-minded civil society groups, the media, the NTCP, and others to establish a coalition pushing for change along an evidence-based tobacco-control policy agenda. The coalition led an advocacy campaign with two objectives: (1) to catalyze the tobacco control policy debate and bring it to the forefront of the national agenda; (2) to ensure the proposed law under discussion becomes in line with best evidence, as identified in the FCTC, and eventually gets adopted.
One of the early wins of the coalition was its success in getting the industry out of the meetings of the parliamentary committees by highlighting the violation of this practice to article 5.3 of the FCTC. Industry continued to influence policymakers on a one-to-one basis and through media outlets, but their presence in formal deliberations was contained. The enhanced clarity of the concept of 'conflict of interest' was confirmed by one of the interviewees:
The interest groups like the tobacco industry they have their interests that they wanted to protect. The same thing with the other private sectors such as hospitality sector, such as tobacco farmers, the government has mixed interests meaning between the regie and Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics. They all had different interests. Even the MPs had mixed interests some of them progressive some of them had investments in tobacco industry, some of them have voters from the tobacco farmers so it was one of the issues that can be very controversial (Journalist 2).
The tobacco control coalition used a variety of strategies in their advocacy campaign including: (1) Media advocacy (producing editorials, press conferences, position statements, Newspaper articles, Radio and TV coverage), (2) Direct lobbying through continued face (continued)
to face meetings with members of the Lebanese Parliament, (3) Development of a core group of parliament members who were themselves advocates (champions) and who represented each of Lebanon's main political parties, (4) Rapid responses to counter arguments. Table 3 summarizes the main advocacy components of the campaign that spanned from 2009 to 2011. The campaign served to build the momentum for change and prime the politics stream. Coalition members succeeded in shifting the positions of policy and decision makers through dialogue and persuasion. Media channels began independently adopting the topic and provided pro bono primetime coverage for the advocacy campaign. The partnership approach, though time consuming, increased effective communication between the different parties involved in the lobbying. Members of the coalition who were interviewed shared their appreciation of the network that was built between academics and other players, and the receipt of constant updates about the policy process through timely press releases and information on new studies when needed. This was seen to support the other partners involved in the campaign.
Parliamentarians, I think, respect things that are academic, and they fear the media. So, we must bet on this, and combine the academic with the media, and this happened to some extent with the campaign to pass the law. There were academics and the media, both pressuring from the same place, and speaking the same language and they created a miracle (Journalist 3).
By 2011, the politics stream, based on concerted efforts by a coalition of stakeholders with critical yet complementary skill sets created a context that was in favour of the passage of a tobacco control law in Lebanon.
Who were the policy entrepreneurs?
The success of any policy change is dependent on policy entrepreneurs. In essence, the advocacy campaign was a campaign of policy entrepreneurs. The TCRG members were collectively and individually key policy entrepreneurs who were involved in every aspect of defining the problem and the solution, as well as creating the coalition to influence the politics. TCRG members provided the base upon which the law became viable. Kingdon suggests that policy entrepreneurs need to have a 'claim to a hearing'. The TCRG fulfilled that claim as they were perceived to be experts and had status and credibility.
They increased scientific information . . .all the informationwhether surveys related to air quality that we are breathing in Beirut, or about cancer, or about economics, or about the experience of other countries what happened. . . all this, it may be that not all information is there, but in the end, we need to depend on academics, in my opinion, there was no way we could have done without the support of academics in this effort (Parliamentarian 1).
In addition, within the government, and because of GBI funding, the manager for the National Tobacco Control Program who was a cardiologist and very committed to tobacco control was supported. He pushed for the issue among parliamentarians and reminded them of their FCTC obligations in various policymaking arenas and within the MOPH. As noted by one of the journalist interviewed, he contributed considerably to framing tobacco control as an issue at the national level.
Yes, he (NTCP Director) was one of the key people in this historic battle, the battle did not start yesterday, it is the daughter of the past, I'm talking about ten years, I have been working in this area (Journalist 3).
Also, two non-governmental organizations were key policy entrepreneurs: TFI and Indyact. Both NGOs have strong 'political connections and negotiating skills' which are qualifications of 'policy entrepreneurs'.
Finally, the media also influenced the process, particularly since it was considered to be the only means of reaching a large number of people. The media also could pressure parliamentarians to take action without facing any consequences.
We had still not won the fight until the day we partnered with the media. Without the media, we wouldn't have reached here. The day the media told us they are on board with us, that was it. For us we had won the fight. The media puts pressure in a way that frightens the Ministers and Deputies (Civil Society 1).
This combination of policy-entrepreneurs provided a strong coalition to shift the balance of power in the politics stream, and push successfully for the passage of Law 174. This combination was particularly effective in that each brought different skills to the table. The TCRG provided robust evidence-based research and was perceived to be a neutral party with high credibility and convening power. The NGOs had substantial experience in advocating for social or environmental issues, and could shame and blame politicians; and expose the tobacco industry and their allies-in ways that neither the University partners nor the government could do. The NTCP provided the government presence and the details of the parliamentary deliberations. This information served to identify opposition to certain policy solutions, the source of the opposition, and thus helped in framing counter arguments. The media took on the evidence, provided a platform for the advocates, and influenced national mood. All these policy entrepreneurs worked together at disseminating tobacco control research findings and lobbied stakeholders to support stronger evidence-based provisions.
Discussion
This manuscript used Kingdon's multiple streams model to understand the process that led to the adoption of a comprehensive tobacco control policy in Lebanon; and to analyse the influence of various players in the passage of Law 174. Findings pointed to the convergence between problem, policy, and politics, in the presence of strong policy entrepreneurs-as proposed by Kingdon-to create a window of opportunity for passage of the law. Despite the challenge of strong tobacco industry interference and established power relations between the industry, its allies and policymakers, policy entrepreneurs succeeded in providing and advocating for policy solutions that were evidence-based. This resulted in effectively responding to propagated tobacco industry arguments that have historically undermined progress in tobacco control policy making.
The campaign contributed to all three streams, it defined the problem and its severity, provided policy solutions in various ways, and finally helped in shaping receptivity of the public and decision makers for change. Previous scholarship on the policy making process for different health outcomes in LMICs has suggested that several conditions facilitate attention to specific issues (Shiffman et al. 2004; Ha et al. 2015) . These include a focusing event, the willingness of international 'networks to share . . .control of resources with domestic officials', the availability of 'credible indicator(s) to mark the severity of a problem', the presence of clear policy potions and of local policy entrepreneurs (Shiffman et al. 2004) . The passage of law 174 was influenced by most of these. The receipt of Bloomberg funding by the National Tobacco Control Program, as well as the close connection between the NTCP director and international agencies such as the WHO, certainly impacted forward movement. In addition, the academic research produced local data which -when presented alongside international evidence -was critical in documenting both the problem and credible solutions. Also, there were clearly several active and engaged policy entrepreneurs. In the Lebanon case, there was no signal focusing event that can be easily identified.
Application of Kingdon's model to policy making around health issues (other than tobacco control) in LMICs has generally confirmed the relevance of the model, but also suggested specificities of the context. One such specificity is the enhanced significance of 'punctuated equilibrium'-which describes policy making as influenced by long periods of stability interrupted by sudden shifts that open opportunity for change (Walt et al. 2008) . In addition, previous research in LMICs has indicated the importance of the changing political historical context which shapes both the process and interpretation of policy (Currie and Clancy 2011; Colombini et al. 2016; Llamas and Mayhew 2016) . Our analysis of the history of tobacco control policy making in Lebanon harmonizes with both these ideas. As is evident, there was progress at various intervals (2003, 2005) linked to shifts in the problem or policy streams, but this stymied as a result of the sociopolitical environment.
Furthermore, evidence suggests the importance of the policy entrepreneurs working together in a cohesive policy community (Shiffman et al. 2004; Shiffman and Ved 2007; Currie and Clancy 2011; Shroff et al. 2012; Ha et al. 2015) . The coalition described in this manuscript was such a community. The various policy entrepreneurs worked together on an agreed-upon common agenda. This unified front strengthened the influence of the coalition. Although previous literature noted the diversity of institutions comprising the policy community, there has been less discussion of the convergence of unique skill sets. We found this aspect to be a key factor to the success of the coalition. Each of the coalition partners brought forth a skill set that waxed or waned depending on the phase of the advocacy campaign, or its specific activities.
In the case of Lebanon, some of the key factors that converged to push tobacco control to the front of the policy agenda included (in chronological order of their occurrence): clear local evidence of health and economic consequences; the FCTC ratification; funding from international sources (BGI and IDRC); the advocacy campaign and pressure groups who agreed to a consistent message; the interest of politicians and legislators and their role in the process; blocked tobacco industry interference, and overall political environment. The literature concurs that most of these factors play a vital role in pushing the problem to the policy agenda (Chapman and Wakefield 2001; Cohen et al. 2002; Holm and Davis 2004; Studlar 2005; Hyland et al. 2012; Uang et al. 2016) . It is difficult to pinpoint which of these factors is the most critical. However, a review of policy making around other health issues in Lebanon (food, water, etc.) suggests that the overall political environment-i.e. the extent of uncertainty and violent political events-may be one of the most critical factors. In the absence of 'relative' stability, policy making around health issues may be impossible. Once the political environment was conducive, then the implementation of an advocacy campaign led by a strong multi-skilled coalition with a consistent message was essential to success. We posit tobacco industry interference to be another key critical factor (Nakkash and Lee 2008, 2009) .
As noted throughout, academic researchers provided much of the local evidence that supported the messages of the advocacy campaign. However, they also extended beyond their role as researchers to play a coordinating role in the advocacy campaign. LMICs often lack non-governmental organizations with primary missions of advocacy or lobbying for health or social causes. In these settings, academics may need to take some part of this role. The experience of the tobacco control law -and advocacy for evidence-based policy making around other health issues -were instrumental in informing the development of a 'Knowledge to Policy' Center at our Faculty.
1
In the case of tobacco control policy in Lebanon, Kingdon's multiple stream approach was useful in explaining how this public health problem became an emerging policy issue at the front of the policy agenda. Although the outcome resulted in the passage of law 174, this may not always be the case. Analysis of the failures to pass a strong and comprehensive policy suggest that disagreement and fragmentation of the advocacy groups, conflict of interests and values (Mamudu et al. 2014; Kehler and Hahn 2016) ; as well as partisanship and lack of political bargaining (Kehler and Hahn 2016) may be key factors.
The public policy process includes agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, enforcement and evaluation (Shiffman and Ved 2007) . This analysis specifically focused on the convergence of the problem, policy and politics streams in agenda setting and policy formulation resulting the passage of law 174, and has not tackled the subsequent struggle of implementation and enforcement. As noted earlier, law 174 had three main features: the ban on ads, promotion and sponsorship went into effect immediately after the passage of the law and has been respected by all parties except for a few violations noted in sponsorship (Salloum et al. 2013) . Larger textual warnings were stipulated by Decree/Bylaw 8991 in October 2012, and these remain in place. The ban on smoking in indoor places in the hospitality sector came into effect one year after the law was passed, and was relatively strictly enforced for three months. Subsequently, enforcement ceased as a result of strong lobbying particularly of the establishments (restaurants) where waterpipe was offered. The Ministry of Tourism also stopped its enforcement claiming that the law was negatively influencing tourism despite efforts by the tobacco control community to counter these claims with data. Although the present situation of smoke-free places remains much better than prior to the law, a lot of ground has been lost as a result of lack of political will to enforce this component of the law. Challenges in implementation after policy formulation have been described in other countries and with other health issues (Shiffman and Ved 2007) .
The analysis of the passage of law 174 and the various problem, policy and politics streams is limited in several ways. We were not able to access minutes of the parliamentary health committee, nor that of the parliament proceeding. This would certainly have enriched the analysis and provided a more in-depth understanding of the leading influential factors for policy adoption. Additionally, a recent review of policy research in LMICs noted the fact that the published literature lack reflexivity by the authors (Gilson and Raphaely 2008) . Attention to positionality is important (Walt et al. 2008) . Insiders and outsiders each bring benefits and biases to any policy research (Walt et al. 2008) . The analysis presented in this article was conducted by members of the TCRG who were heavily involved in the process, and therefore, biases in interpretation may be present. Despite this, we relied heavily on the results of the interviews with 15 stakeholders who were similarly involved (and quote from them extensively). In an attempt to limit the influence of our insider position (Walt et al. 2008) , the interviews were conducted by a researcher who had no involvement in the advocacy campaign at all. Finally, Kingdon's approach has been criticized by some scholars for its inability to capture/analyse the full process of how a problem becomes a policy and for failing to address/understand the power differences between 'stakeholders and also between the political streams that affect a proposal once it has made its way to the agenda' (Blackman 2005) .
Conclusion
In conclusion, the analysis presented in this article provides some insight into the various streams that allowed tobacco control Law 174 to pass in Lebanon despite the country being historically called a 'paradise of smokers' (Moussaoui 2012) . The results confirm the importance of the convergence of problem, policy and politics streams as a key factor in creating a conducive environment for policy change. The analysis further points to the significance of the sociopolitical and historical context in the understanding of policy making-suggesting that for countries with high political uncertainty, tobacco control policy making may stall. Finally, our results further substantiated the critical value of an advocacy campaign led by policy entrepreneurs in achieving change. Note 1. https://website.aub.edu.lb/k2p/about/Pages/objectives.aspx.
